Trust and Fear in Civil Wars : Ending Intrastate Conflicts
Why do some civil wars last a long time, while others end relatively quickly? Trust and Fear in Civil Wars examines the conditions under which individuals are willing to lay down their weapons under a settlement agreement. The author argues that wars are easiest to resolve when combatants believe that their adversaries will uphold a deal or that the costs of renewed war will be low. Several key sources of information inform this calculation. Drawing on both cross-national and case study data, including detailed interviews, the book demonstrates that when information suggests either that a peace agreement is likely to break down or that the results of a broken deal will be especially deadly, a settlement leaves combatants too vulnerable to countenance, resulting in wars lasting longer.
- Paperback | 200 pages
- 149 x 231 x 15mm | 308g
- 24 Mar 2017
- Lexington Books
- Lanham, MD, United States
- 8 charts, 5 tables
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10 Jul 2015
About Shanna Kirschner
Shanna Kirschner is assistant professor of political science at Allegheny College.
Table of contents
Chapter One: Introduction Chapter Two: Trust and Fears for the Future Chapter Three: Trust and Fear across Civil Wars Chapter Four: Sri Lanka: Both Short And Long Civil Wars Chapter Five: Turkey: Ongoing Conflict With No Settlement Chapter Six: Cyprus: Frozen Conflict with No Settlement Chapter Seven: Conclusions