The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods

The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods

4.33 (3 ratings by Goodreads)
By (author)  , By (author) 

List price: US$194.99

Currently unavailable

We can notify you when this item is back in stock

Add to wishlist

AbeBooks may have this title (opens in new window).

Try AbeBooks

Description

This book presents a theoretical treatment of externalities (i.e. uncompensated interdependencies), public goods, and club goods. The new edition updates and expands the discussion of externalities and their implications, coverage of asymmetric information, underlying game-theoretic formulations, and intuitive and graphical presentations. Aimed at well-prepared undergraduates and graduate students making a serious foray into this branch of economics, the analysis should also interest professional economists wishing to survey recent advances in the field. No other single source for the range of materials explored is currently available. Topics investigated include Nash equilibrium, Lindahl equilibria, club theory, preference-revelation mechanism, Pigouvian taxes, the commons, Coase Theorem, and static and repeated games. The authors use mathematical techniques only as much as necessary to pursue the economic argument. They develop key principles of public economics that are useful for subfields such as public choice, labor economics, economic growth, international economics, environmental and natural resource economics, and industrial organization.show more

Product details

  • Online resource
  • Cambridge University Press (Virtual Publishing)
  • Cambridge, United Kingdom
  • English
  • Revised
  • 2nd Revised edition
  • 74 b/w illus. 13 tables
  • 1139174312
  • 9781139174312

Table of contents

Preface; Part I. Introduction to the Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods: 1. Views on market failure; 2. Equilibrium concepts in public economics; Part II. Externalities: 3. Theory of externalities; 4. Externalities, equilibrium, and optimality; 5. Information and externalities; Part III. Public Goods: 6. Pure public goods: Nash-Cournot equilibria and Pareto optimality; 7. Alternative mechanisms for the provision of public goods; 8. Public goods in general; 9. Game theory and public goods; 10. Departures from the Nash-Cournot behavior; Part IV. Clubs and Club Goods: 11. Homogeneous clubs and local public goods; 12. Clubs in general; 13. Institutional forms and clubs; 14. Game theory and club goods; 15. Uncertainty and club goods; 16. Intergenerational clubs; Part V. Applications and Future Directions: 17. Empirical estimation and public goods; 18. Applications and empirics; 19. Conclusions.show more

Rating details

3 ratings
4.33 out of 5 stars
5 33% (1)
4 67% (2)
3 0% (0)
2 0% (0)
1 0% (0)
Book ratings by Goodreads
Goodreads is the world's largest site for readers with over 50 million reviews. We're featuring millions of their reader ratings on our book pages to help you find your new favourite book. Close X