Simulating Minds : The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading
refines an approach called simulation theory, which starts from the familiar idea that we understand others by putting ourselves in their mental shoes. Can this intuitive idea be rendered precise in a philosophically respectable manner, without allowing simulation to collapse into theorizing? Given
a suitable definition, do empirical results support the notion that minds literally create (or attempt to create) surrogates of other peoples mental states in the process of mindreading? Goldman amasses a surprising array of evidence from psychology and neuroscience that supports this hypothesis.
- Paperback | 384 pages
- 155 x 235 x 30mm | 539g
- 02 May 2008
- Oxford University Press Inc
- New York, United States
- 7 line illustrations
Table of contents
1: Internalism Exposed
2: A Priori Warrant and Naturalistic Epistemology
3: The Unity of the Epistemic Virtues
PART II: INTUITION, INTROSPECTION, AND CONSCIOUSNESS
4: Philosophical Theory and Intuitional Evidence (with Joel Pust)
5: Science, Publicity, and Consciousness
6: Can Science Know When You're Conscious?
PART III: SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY
7: Experts: Which Ones Should you Trust?
8: Social Routes to Belief and Knowledge
9: What is Social Epistemology? A Smorgasbord of Projects
About Alvin I. Goldman