Reports of Cases Argued and Determined in the Supreme Court of Judicature of the State of Indiana, with Tables of the Cases Reported and Cases Cited and an Index

Reports of Cases Argued and Determined in the Supreme Court of Judicature of the State of Indiana, with Tables of the Cases Reported and Cases Cited and an Index

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This historic book may have numerous typos and missing text. Purchasers can usually download a free scanned copy of the original book (without typos) from the publisher. Not indexed. Not illustrated. 1884 edition. Excerpt: ...upon the ground that it has not been shown that he knew that his profession and statements were false. In Frenzelv. Miller, 37 Ind. 1 (10 Am. R. 62), it was held that "If the statement be in fact false, and be uttered for a fraudulent purpose, which is in fact accomplished, it has the whole eifect of a fraud in annulling the contract, although the person uttering the statement did not know it to be false, but believed it to be true." This doctrine has often been approved. Broohs v. Biding, 46 Ind. 15; Krewson v. Cloud, 45 Ind. 273; Booker v. Goldsborough, 44 Ind. 490. Mr. Pomeroy thus states the rule: "Where a person makes an untrue statement, and has at the time no knowledge of its truth, and there are no reasonable grounds for his believing it to be true, he is chargeable with fraud, although he had no absolute knowledge of its untruth, and may claim to have had a belief in its truth." 2 Pomeroy Eq., section 887. In speaking of a case somewhat like the present, BlackFord, J., said: "The plain, honest doctrine is, that if the seller could not, or would not, convey it (the land) to the purchaser, he had no right to the purchase-money." Leonard v. Bates, 1 Blackf. 172. That remark applies here; "the plain, honest doctrine" is, that the appellant should not get $4,000 and more of the appellee's property and yield nothing in return. It is exceedingly doubtful, whether a party who demurs to Rhoads V. Jones et al. evidence can afterwards move for a new trial on the ground that the court erred in excluding evidence, but we do not decide that question as it has not been argued. Assuming, but not deciding, that the appellant had a right to move for a new trial, we inquire whether the court erred in...show more

Product details

  • Paperback
  • 189 x 246 x 13mm | 435g
  • Rarebooksclub.com
  • United States
  • English
  • black & white illustrations
  • 1236808916
  • 9781236808912