The Regulation of Monopoly
Competition may not function well where technology calls for large and complex investments, as in the electrivity industry where public utilities often provide service. This book presents economic welfare foundations for the purpose of evaluating how well, from a social point of view, an enterprise performs when competition is unable to function. Problems with existing institutions are emphasized. Topics treated include welfare measures and their uses in peak-load pricing, second-best pricing, and income distribution. Professor Sherman covers public choice difficulties of government intervention, and describes problems with incentives in statutory monopolies and efforts to overcome them through the study of principal-agent relationships. Contestability and sustainable prices are also discussed, as well as effects of uncertainty and imperfect information.
- Electronic book text
- 11 May 2012
- CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
- Cambridge University Press (Virtual Publishing)
- Cambridge, United Kingdom
Table of contents
Preface; Part I. Introduction: 1. The regulation of monopoly; 2. Representing economic welfare; 3. Pursuing economic welfare; Part II. Optimal Pricing: 4. Ideal public pricing; 5. Second-best public pricing; 6. Equity in public pricing; Part III. Institutions of Monopoly Regulation: 7. Rate-return regulation; 8. Input choices under rate-of-return regulation; 9. Pricing under rate-of-return regulation; 10. The budget-constrained public enterprise; Part IV. Conclusion: 11. Conclusion; References; Index.