Reasons for Belief
Philosophers have long been concerned about what we know and how we know it. Increasingly, however, a related question has gained prominence in philosophical discussion: what should we believe and why? This volume brings together twelve new essays that address different aspects of this question. The essays examine foundational questions about reasons for belief, and use new research on reasons for belief to address traditional epistemological concerns such as knowledge, justification and perceptually acquired beliefs. This book will be of interest to philosophers working on epistemology, theoretical reason, rationality, perception and ethics. It will also be of interest to cognitive scientists and psychologists who wish to gain deeper insight into normative questions about belief and knowledge.
- Electronic book text | 296 pages
- 31 May 2011
- CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
- Cambridge University Press (Virtual Publishing)
- Cambridge, United Kingdom
- 4 b/w illus.
Table of contents
Contributors; Introduction; Part I. Normative Reasons for Belief: 1. How to be a teleologist about epistemic reasons Asbjorn Steglich-Petersen; 2. Is there reason to be theoretically rational? Andrew Reisner; 3. Epistemic motivation: towards a metaethics of belief Veli Mitova; 4. Error theory and reasons for belief Jonas Olson; 5. Can reasons for belief be debunked? Nishi Shah; Part II. Reasons and Epistemic Justification: 6. Reasons and the justification of belief Clayton Littlejohn; 7. Perception, generality and reasons Hannah Ginsborg; 8. Immediate warrant, epistemic responsibility, and Moorean dogmatism Adam Leite; 9. Primitively rational belief-forming practices Ralph Wedgwood; 10. What does it take to 'have' a reason? Mark Schroeder; 11. Knowledge and reasons for belief Alan Millar; 12. What is the swamping problem? Duncan Pritchard.
"This book focuses on what are called theoretical reasons. The topic of interest resides both in practical philosophy, where the importance of the ability to give reasons for action has long been recognized, and in several specific areas of epistemology, where reasons play important roles in regard to questions of justification, warrant, and epistemic entitlement.... Recommended.... Upper-level undergraduates through researchers/faculty." --N.D. Smith, Lewis and Clark College, Choice
About Andrew Reisner
Andrew Reisner is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at McGill University. He has published a number of articles on theoretical reason and normativity. Asbjorn Steglich-Petersen is Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy at Aarhus University. He has published widely in epistemology and metaphysics, and is editor of Metaphysics: 5 Questions (2011).