Rationality, Social Action and Moral Judgement
This book examines some of the major sociological and jurisprudential writers on the nature of rationality and its relation to action. Unorthodoxly, it argues that value-judgements are a desirable part of the social sciences and are quite compatible with claims to objectivity and universality. Toddington rethinks the philosophical positions of Weber, Hollis, Finnis, Habermas and Gewirth. He examines the post-modernist positions (especially the work of Richard Rorty) and shows how debates about law reflect more general and abstract themes about the nature of society and our means of living it. This book is intended for scholars and students of legal philosophy and the sociology of law.
- Hardback | 240 pages
- 147.3 x 236.2 x 17.8mm | 476.28g
- 01 Nov 1993
- EDINBURGH UNIVERSITY PRESS
- Edinburgh, United Kingdom