The Quest for Reality : Subjectivism and the Metaphysics of Colour
We say "the grass is green" or "lemons are yellow" to state what everyone knows. But are the things we see around us really coloured, or do they only look that way because of the effects of light rays on our eyes and brains? Is colour somehow "unreal" or "subjective" and dependent on our human perceptions and the conditions under which we see things? Distinguished scholar Barry Stroud investigates these and related questions in The Quest for Reality. In this long-awaited book, he examines what a person would have to do and believe in order to reach the conclusion that everyone's perceptions and beliefs about the colour of things are "illusions" and do not accurately represent the way things are in the world as it is independently of us. Arguing that no such conclusion could be consistently reached, Stroud finds that the conditions of a successful unmasking of colour cannot all be fulfilled. The discussion extends beyond colour to present a serious challenge to many other philosophical attempts to discover the way things really are. A model of subtle, elegant, and rigorous philosophical writing, this study will attract a wide audience from all areas of philosophy.
- Hardback | 246 pages
- 165.6 x 242.3 x 23.6mm | 521.64g
- 16 Dec 1999
- Oxford University Press Inc
- New York, United States
- bibliography, index
Table of contents
1. Introduction: The Philosophical Project; 2. The Philosophical Conception of an Independent Reality; 3. The Idea of Physical Reality; 4. Unmasking Explanation and the "Unreality" of Colour; 5. Perception, Predication, and Belief; 6. Perceptions of Colour and the Colour of Things; 7. Perception, Judgment, and Error; 8. Discomforts and Distortions of Metaphysical Theory; 9. Engagement, Invulnerability, and Dissatisfaction; 10. Morals; Bibliography; Index
About Barry Stroud
Barry Stroud is Mills Professor of Metaphysics and Epistemology at the University of California, Berkeley, and author of Hume (1977) and The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism (1984).