The Political Construction of Business Interests : Coordination, Growth, and Equality
Many societies use labor market coordination to maximize economic growth and equality, yet employers' willing cooperation with government and labor is something of a mystery. The Political Construction of Business Interests recounts employers' struggles to define their collective social identities at turning points in capitalist development. Employers are most likely to support social investments in countries with strong peak business associations, that help members form collective preferences and realize policy goals in labor market negotiations. Politicians, with incentives shaped by governmental structures, took the initiative in association-building and those that created the strongest associations were motivated to evade labor radicalism and to preempt parliamentary democratization. Sweeping in its historical and cross-national reach, the book builds on original archival data, interviews and cross-national quantitative analyses. The research has important implications for the construction of business as a social class and powerful ramifications for equality, welfare state restructuring and social solidarity.
- Electronic book text
- 20 May 2012
- CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
- Cambridge University Press (Virtual Publishing)
- Cambridge, United Kingdom
- 4 b/w illus. 15 tables
Table of contents
Introduction; 1. Collective political engagement and the welfare state; 2. The political origins of coordinated capitalism; 3. The political origins of Danish employers' associations; 4. British experiments in national employers' organization; 5. Sectional parties, divided business in the United States; 6. The origins of sector coordination in Germany; 7. Twenty-first century breakdown: challenges to coordination in the post-industrial age; 8. Institutional sources of firms' preferences for the welfare state; 9. Employers, coordination, and active labor market policy in post-industrial Denmark; 10. Employers, coordination, and active labor market policy in post-industrial Britain; 11. The failure of coordination and rise of dualism in Germany; 12. The political foundations of redistribution and equality; Conclusion: 13. Social solidarity after the crisis of finance capitalism.
'Why do employers cooperate with the state in some nations, but elsewhere resist its incursions? How do employers become not just economic, but political actors? Such are the questions grappled with in this methodologically sophisticated, massively documented study that impressively covers both sides of the Atlantic from the nineteenth century to the present.' Peter Baldwin, University of California, Los Angeles 'Why do the wealthy countries with the strongest business communities have the most generous social welfare systems and the least inequality? Using rich historical analysis coupled with sophisticated statistical studies, Martin and Swank offer a fresh and compelling answer. They show that business interests are shaped by the structure of democratic governance. This marvelous book challenges our most fundamental ideas about where group interests come from, and it has important, and unsettling, implications for the future of equality and democracy.' Frank Dobbin, Harvard University 'The Political Construction of Business Interests is an impressive book that takes on multiple issues and, in order to address them, mobilizes statistical estimations, case studies grounded in archival research, and interview data. Whatever controversies it ignites, however, this book is a major achievement. Vastly illuminating about the origins of business associations, it shows that those associations are important to a wide range of social outcomes about which we should all care.' Peter A. Hall, Harvard University
About Cathie Jo Martin
Cathie Jo Martin is Professor of Political Science at Boston University and former chair of the Council for European Studies. She is the author of Stuck in Neutral: Business and the Politics of Human Capital Investment Policy (2000) and Shifting the Burden: The Struggle over Growth and Corporate Taxation (1991) and has held fellowships at the Radcliffe Institute and the Russell Sage Foundation. Duane Swank is Professor of Political Science at Marquette University and Vice President/President-Elect of the American Political Science Association Organized Section in Comparative Politics. He is the author of Global Capital, Political Institutions, and Policy Change in Developed Welfare States (Cambridge 2002) and has held fellowships with the German Marshall Fund and at the Australian National University.