Moral Knowledge: Volume 18, Part 2
Philosophers since ancient times have pondered how we can know whether moral claims are true or false. The first half of the twentieth century witnessed widespread skepticism concerning the possibility of moral knowledge. Indeed, some argued that moral statements lacked cognitive content altogether, because they were not susceptible to empirical verification. The British philosopher A. J. Ayer contends that 'They are pure expressions of feeling and as such do not come under the category of truth and falsehood. They are unverifiable ... because they do not express genuine propositions.' The second half of the twentieth century brought a revival of interest among philosophers in moral and political questions. Whether or not ethics can be founded upon a rational basis continues to preoccupy the philosophical community even now.
- Electronic book text
- 11 May 2012
- CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
- Cambridge University Press (Virtual Publishing)
- Cambridge, United Kingdom
Table of contents
1. Realist-expressivism: a neglected option for moral realism David Copp; 2. Thinking about cases Shelly Kagan; 3. But I could be wrong George Sher; 4. Moral facts and best explanations Brian Leiter; 5. Two sources of morality Philip Pettit; 6. 'Because I Want It' Stephen Darwall; 7. Realism, naturalism, and moral semantics David O. Brink; 8. Incomplete routes to moral objectivity: four variants of naturalism David Sidorsky; 9. Explanation, internalism, and reasons for action David Sobel; 10. Moral knowledge as practical knowledge Julia Annas; 11. Practical reason and moral psychology in Aristotle and Kant James Bernard Murphy; 12. Hypothetical consent in Kantian constructivism Thomas E. Hill, Jr.; 13. Mill's 'proof' of the principle of utility: a more than half-hearted defense Geoffrey Sayre-McCord.