Minnesota Reports; Cases Argued and Determined in the Supreme Court of Minnesota Volume 48

Minnesota Reports; Cases Argued and Determined in the Supreme Court of Minnesota Volume 48

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This historic book may have numerous typos and missing text. Purchasers can usually download a free scanned copy of the original book (without typos) from the publisher. Not indexed. Not illustrated. 1898 edition. Excerpt: ...a preference. Nor does it rebut the inference otherwise deducible from the facts that it was intended to be a preference. Forbes v. Howe, 102 Mass. 427, 435; Denny v. Dana, 2 Cush. 160. Cunningham is conclusively presumed to have intended the necessary consequences of his acts. Therefore the denial in the answer of an intent to give a preference is of no avail. In re Sutherland, 1 Deady, 348; In re Silverman, 1 Sawy. 410; Tripp v. Northwestern Naf. Bank, 45 Minn. 383; Hastings Malting Co. v. Heller, 47 Minn. 71; In re Bininger, 7 Blatchf. 267. W. W. Billson, for respondent. In this action, brought by the assignee of an insolvent, to set aside a mortgage as preferential, the only question presented by the record is, was the evidence such as to justify the finding of fact that the mortgage was not made with a view to give a preference to Cunningham? The only question in the case is one of law. The decision of the court could not have been otherwise, unless the law is, as claimed by counsel for plaintiff, that, because it turned out that the mortgage did ultimately, and in fact, secure a preference to Cunningham, it must therefore be inexorably inferred that it was given and received with the intent to secure such preference. But the statute invalidates the security only when made with a view to give a preference. This means, no doubt, with an actual intention to prefer, except so far as such intention may be constructively imputed by force of the recognized and well-defined principle that a man is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his acts. 2 Bigelow, Frauds, 579; Smith v. Merrill, 9 Gray, 144. In Forbes v. Howe, 102 Mass. 427, the defendant, by his third request, had asked the court to instruct the jury that, if...show more

Product details

  • Paperback
  • 189 x 246 x 12mm | 399g
  • Rarebooksclub.com
  • United States
  • English
  • black & white illustrations
  • 1236943708
  • 9781236943705