Military Threats

Military Threats : The Costs of Coercion and the Price of Peace

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Description

Is military power central in determining which states get their voice heard? Must states run a high risk of war to communicate credible intent? In this book, Slantchev shows that states can often obtain concessions without incurring higher risks when they use military threats. Unlike diplomatic forms of communication, physical military moves improve a state's expected performance in war. If the opponent believes the threat, it will be more likely to back down. Military moves are also inherently costly, so only resolved states are willing to pay these costs. Slantchev argues that powerful states can secure better peaceful outcomes and lower the risk of war, but the likelihood of war depends on the extent to which a state is prepared to use military threats to deter challenges to peace and compel concessions without fighting. The price of peace may therefore be large: states invest in military forces that are both costly and unused.show more

Product details

  • Electronic book text | 328 pages
  • CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
  • Cambridge University Press (Virtual Publishing)
  • Cambridge, United Kingdom
  • English
  • 1139005499
  • 9781139005494

Table of contents

Part I. Coercion and Credibility: 1. Introduction; 2. Commitment and signalling in coercive bargaining; Part II. A Theory of Military Threats: 3. A model of military threats; 4. Comparing the instruments of coercion; Part III. Elements of Militarized Deterrence: 5. Militarization and the distribution of power and interests; 6. The expansion of the Korean War, 1950; 7. The price of peace and military threat effectiveness; Part IV. Conclusions: 8. Implications; Appendix A. Formalities for Chapter 2; Appendix B. Formalities for Chapter 3; Appendix C. Formalities for Chapter 4; Appendix D. Formalities for Chapter 5.show more

Review quote

'This book is an impressive display of intellectual firepower. It will be required reading for anyone interested in crisis bargaining or deterrence.' R. Harrison Wagner, University of Texas, Austin 'Military Threats offers the most comprehensive and sophisticated analysis of crisis bargaining and escalation I know. Full of new insights and intuitions, this book defines the cutting edge of research in one of the most important areas of formal work on war, that of endogenizing the distribution of power.' Robert Powell, Robson Professor of Political Science, University of California, Berkeleyshow more

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