This book examines the gap that exists between the intelligence collection mission of the division in the contingency corps and the capabilities to execute these collection requirements. Doctrine tells us that a division in a contingency corps must be able to perform at the same echelon of command as a forward deployed corps. A division's intelligence collection requirements, once it arrives in theater, are critical to the success of its mission. However, a division is not a corps especially in the force design of its intelligence collection assets. This study establishes the fundamental differences between a division and a corps by examining the theoretical underpinnings that distinguish the two. It proceeds to look at current doctrine concerning both division and corps operations. It examines the force structure for intelligence collection assets at division and corps with emphasis on the (continued on other side of form) long-range surveillance (LRS) teams as a possible means to close the collection gap. It uses the Soviet experience with LRS type units as a guide for possible changes in the US force design. The book concludes that more is better at the division level. More LRS teams are needed in the division of the contingency corps. They can be acquired through the permanent reapportionment of corps assets.