Indivisible Selves and Moral Practice
Ever since David Parfit published his "Reasons and Persons" in 1985, there has been intense debate in philosophical psychology about the status of intellectual thought-experiments - "what would we say if?". Directly countering Parfit's view that our moral life must be tailored to our speculation about the mind, the author argues in this new book that presuppositions in our moral and practical life should have a bearing on what we believe about persons and personal identity. He defends the indivisible self view, using a detailed examination of the empirical evidence arising from split-brain and multiple-personality cases. He outlines the moral, social, legal and practical implications of the different views of the self (and non-self), and deals extensively with suffering, individual persons and groups. A new contribution to the nature of the self, this book uses moral philosophy to tackle the problems of personal identity. It is aimed at advanced undergraduate and graduate students and teachers of philosophy of mind and moral philosophy, theology, psychology and law.
- Paperback | 240 pages
- 127 x 213.4 x 17.8mm | 362.88g
- 01 Apr 1993
- EDINBURGH UNIVERSITY PRESS
- Edinburgh, United Kingdom
- New edition
- New edition
Table of contents
Persons and personal identity; consciousness and its importance; scepticism and practical life; gambling in the dark and reflective equilibrium; split brains; multiplie personality; non-reductionism and the use of imaginary examples; egoistical concern without an ego; persons, justice and dessert.