Improvements of the Understanding, Ethics, and Correspondence

Improvements of the Understanding, Ethics, and Correspondence

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This historic book may have numerous typos and missing text. Purchasers can usually download a free scanned copy of the original book (without typos) from the publisher. Not indexed. Not illustrated. 1901 edition. Excerpt: ...because there was in that place no need to distinguish them accurately.) V. By Conflicting Emotions I mean those which draw a man in different directions, though they are of the same kind, such as luxury and avarice, which are both species of love, and are contraries, not by nature, but by accident. VI. What I mean by emotion felt toward a thing, future, present, and past, I explained in III. xviii., notes i. and ii., which see. (But I should here also remark, that we can only distinctly conceive distance of space or time up to a certain definite limit; that is, all objects distant from us more than two hundred feet, or whose distance from the place where we are exceeds that which we can distinctly conceive, seem to be an equal distance from us, and all in the same plane; so also objects, whose time of existing is conceived as removed from the present by a longer interval than we can distinctly conceive, seem to be all equally distant from the present, and are set down, as it were, to the same moment of time.) VII. By an End, for the sake of which we do something, mean a desire. VIII. By Virtue virtus) and Power I mean the same thing; that is (III. vii.), virtue, in so far as it is referred to man, is a man's nature or essence, in so far as it has the power of effecting what can only be understood by the laws of that nature. Axiom. There is no individual thing in nature, than which there is not another more powerful and strong. Whatsoever thing be given, there is something stronger whereby it can be destroyed. Prop. I. No positive quality possessed by a false idea is removed by the presence of what is true, in virtue of its being true. Proof.--Falsity consists solely in the privation of knowledge which inadequate ideas involve (II....
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Product details

  • Paperback | 154 pages
  • 189 x 246 x 8mm | 286g
  • English
  • Illustrations, black and white
  • 1236864638
  • 9781236864635