Human Rights and Human Well-Being

Human Rights and Human Well-Being

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Description

In the last half of the twentieth century, legalized segregation ended in the southern United States, apartheid ended in South Africa, women in many parts of the world came to be recognized as having equal rights with men, persons with disabilities came to be recognized as having rights to develop and exercise their human capabilities, colonial peoples' rights of self-determination were recognized, and rights of gays and lesbians have begun to be recognized. It is
hard not to see these developments as examples of real moral progress. But what is moral progress?
In this book, William Talbott offers a surprising answer to that question. He proposes a consequentialist meta-theoretical principle of moral and legal progress, the "main principle", to explain why these changes are examples of moral and legal progress. On Talbott's account, improvements to our moral or legal practices are changes that, when evaluated as a practice, contribute to equitably promoting well-being. Talbott uses the main principle to explain why almost all the substantive moral
norms and principles used in moral or legal reasoning have exceptions and why it is almost inevitable that, no matter how much we improve them, there will always be more exceptions. This explanation enables Talbott to propose a new, non-skeptical understanding of what has been called the "naturalistic
fallacy".

Talbott uses the main principle to complete the project begun in his 2005 book of identifying the human rights that should be universal-that is, legally guaranteed in all human societies. Talbott identifies a list of fourteen robust, inalienable human rights.

Talbott contrasts his consequentialist (though not utilitarian) account with many of the most influential nonconsequentialist accounts of morality and justice in the philosophical literature, including those of Ronald Dworkin, Jurgen Habermas, Martha Nussbaum, Phillip Pettit, John Rawls, T.M. Scanlon, Amartya Sen, Judith Thomson.
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Product details

  • Paperback | 426 pages
  • 157 x 234 x 26mm | 664g
  • New York, United States
  • English
  • Reprint
  • 0199311366
  • 9780199311361
  • 1,479,506

Table of contents

Chapter 1. The Consequentialist Project for Human Rights ; Chapter 2. Exceptions to Libertarian Natural Rights ; Chapter 3. The Main Principle ; Chapter 4. What is Well-Being? What is Equity? ; Chapter 5. The Two Deepest Mysteries in Moral Philosophy ; Chapter 6. Security Rights ; Chapter 7. Epistemological Foundations for the Priority of Autonomy Rights ; Chapter 8. The Millian Epistemological Argument for Autonomy Rights ; Chapter 9. Property Rights, Contract Rights, and Other Economic Rights ; Chapter 10. Democratic Rights ; Chapter 11: Equity Rights ; Chapter 12. The Most Reliable Judgment Standard for Weak Paternalism ; Chapter 13. Liberty Rights and Privacy Rights ; Chapter 14. Clarifications and Responses to Objections ; Chapter 15. Conclusion ; References ; Notes
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Review quote

Human Rights and Human Well-Being is an exemplar of first-rate analytic philosophy extended to pressing normative questions. . . . Talbott's proposed methodology is paradigm shifting and will excite much debate in moral philosophy. . . . There is much to learn from Talbott's incisive treatments of Kant, Rawls, Nozick, Dworkin, and others . . . . Talbott is to be commended for a significant contribution to moral philosophy and the philosophy of human rights. * Kok-Chor Tan, Philosophical Review *
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About William J. Talbott

William J. Talbott is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Washington, where he has been teaching since 1989. He has published articles in moral and political philosophy, especially the philosophy of human rights, philosophy of law, epistemology, and rational choice theory. This is the second of two volumes on human rights. The first was Which Rights Should Be Universal? (OUP, 2005).
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