General Todleben's History of the Defence of Sebastopol, 1854-5 : A Review
The journalist William Howard Russell (1820-1907) is sometimes regarded as being the first war correspondent, and his reports from the conflict in the Crimea are also credited with being a cause of reforms made to the British military system. This 1865 book began as a review in The Times of the five-volume work of General Eduard Todleben (or Totleben), the military engineer and Russian Army General, whose work in creating and continually adapting the land defences of Sevastopol in 1854-5 made him a hero and enabled the fortress to hold out against British bombardment for a whole year. Russell added extracts from the original book to his review, and enlarged his commentary on the Russian text, producing a thorough and accurate synthesis, but always highlighting the central importance of the Russian work to any student of the history of the Sevastopol siege.
- Electronic book text
- 05 Sep 2013
- CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
- Cambridge University Press (Virtual Publishing)
- Cambridge, United Kingdom
Table of contents
Preface; 1. Our first victories; 2. The early and late histories; 3. The Russian history; 4. The march of Russia; 5. The ascent of the Czars; 6. Menschikoff's mission; 7. Declaration of war; 8. Siege of Silistria; 9. Defenceless Russia; 10. The Russian armies; 11. The forces of the Allies; 12. The condition of Sebastopol; 13. The state of Sebastopol; 14. Menschikoff surprised; 15. Selection of the Alma; 16. The choice of landing-places; 17. The night before the battle; 18. The Russian position; 19. The English order of battle; 20. The Russian left engaged; 21. Canrobert and Bosquet; 22. The English begin to move; 23. A check to the French; 24. The English on the right; 25. The English fire; 26. The capture of the Epaulement; 27. The second attack on the Epaulement; 28. Retreat of the Wladimir Regiment; 29. The retreat of the Russians; 30. Russian reasons for their defeat; 31. Causes of the defeat; 32. Delay after victory; 33. Condition of Sebastopol; 34. The works of Sebastopol; 35. Menschikoff's flank march; 36. The sinking of the fleet; 37. The Allies on the Belbeck; 38. State of the North Fort; 39. The flank march; 40. Manschikoff's flank march; 41. Sir John Burgoyne's vindications; 42. Sir John Burgoyne's remarks; 43. Sir John Burgoyne's policy; 44. An advance northward; 45. Surrender of Balaklava; 46. State of the north side; 47. Preparations to resist; 48. Reinforcements for Sebastopol; 49. Korniloff's influence; 50. The first trench opened; 51. The new works; 52. Opposite the English; 53. The English works; 54. Reasons for and against an assault; 55. The first day's fire; 56. The Russians recover spirits; 57. The French again succumb; 58. The economy of Materiel; 59. The actions before Balaklava; 60. Rout of the Turks; 61. The first Russian advance; 62. The light cavalry; 63. The French chasseurs; 64. The results of the action; 65. The effect at Sebastopol; 66. 'Little Inkerman'; 67. General Sir De Lacy Evans' despatch; 68. The French batteries; 69. Peril of the flagstaff bastion; 70. Probable issue of an assault; 71. The opposing forces; 72. The allied strength and position; 73. The nature of the ground; 74. Dispositions for Inkerman; 75. Soimonoff's advance; 76. Attack the camp; 77. Attack Adams's Brigade; 78. The precision of the British fire; 79. Retreat of the 17th Division; 80. The relative numbers; 81. Dannenberg's advance; 82. The Guards rally; 83. Cathcart's disaster; 84. The artillery conflict; 85. The French are summoned; 86. The Russians defeated; 87. The pursuit; 88. Escape of the Russian artillery; 89. The losses; 90. The superiority of English fire-arms; 91. Close of the first period of the siege; 92. The Redan and the British; 93. Moral effect of Inkerman; 94. The great storm; 95. Russian philanthropists; 96. Good Samaritans; 97. The winter begins; 98. British insouciance; 99. The rifle pits; 100. Increase of lodgements; 101. Comparison between French and English; 102. Information to the enemy; 103. The Russian commissariat; 104. The chaos of Balaklava; 105. Russian supplies; 106. Russian transport; 107. Cost of the war; 108. The war of mines; 109. The French take our light attack; 110. Fears for Perekop; 111. Attack on Eupatoria; 112. Todleben's opinion of our troops; 113. The result of delay; 114. Want of forethought; 115. Concluding remarks; Appendices.