The Frontiers of the New Institutional Economics
The New Institutional Economics incorporates a theory of institutions into economics. It builds upon the fundamental assumptions of scarcity and competition but abandons institutional rationality. Consequently, NIE assumes that individuals make choices based on incomplete information and limited mental capacity, forming institutions to reduce uncertainty in human exchange. These insights have implications for technological change, property rights, and public choice. "The Frontiers of the New Institutional Economics" presents new essays written specifically for this volume. These essays provide an introduction to the nature and practice of the New Institutional Economics, with a special emphasis on economic history and political economy. Among the contributors are Nobel Prize winners Douglass North and Robert Fogel. The key features are: contains essays by Nobel Prize winners Douglass North and Robert Fogel; presents a field of economics useful to students of political science and sociology; applicable to studies of technological change, property rights, and public choice.
- Paperback | 374 pages
- 152 x 228 x 20mm | 557.92g
- 01 Mar 1997
- Emerald Publishing Limited
- Academic Press Inc
- United Kingdom
"This striking collection of essays by leading scholars ranges across continents and centuries in its rich and varied analysis of the connections between institutions and economic performance. It boldly expands the horizon of the new institutional economics to include not only the nature and durability of economic organization but its interaction with beliefs, culture, and human capacity for learning." --JAMES ALT, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts "This is one of those rare collections that is accurately titled. Virtually every paper here explores, deeply and originally, fundamental issues in institutional economics. It is an intellectual feast for political scientists, sociologists, and historians as well as for economists and economic historians." --JOHN FEREJOHN, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, California "For anyone interested in the New Institutional Economics and how it can inspire research in the social sciences, this collection represents the best point of departure imaginable. Above all, these studies reflect and symbolize Douglass North's most fundamental contribution, namely to show what happens when History and Economics interact in a fruitful way. The essays produce endless new research ideas in our continuing search for understanding economic change and the way society operates." --JOEL MOKYR, Robert H. Strotz Professor of Arts and Sciences, Departments of Economics and History, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois
Table of contents
Theoretical Foundations: D.C. North, Prologue. R.W. Fogel, Douglass C. North and Economic Theory. Economic History: P.T. Hoffman and J.-L. Rosenthal, The Political Economy of Warfare and Taxation in Early Modern Europe: Historical Lessons for Economic Development. A. Greif, On the Interrelations and Economic Implications of Economic, Social, Political and Normative Factors: Reflections From Two Late Medieval Societies. S.L. Engerman, Cultural Values, Ideological Beliefs, and Changing Labor Institutions: Notes on Their Interactions. J.V.C. Nye, Thinking About the State: Property Rights, Trade, and Changing Contractual Arrangements in a World with Coercion. Institutions and Political Economy: L.J. Alston, G.D. Libecap, B. Mueller, Violence and the Development of Property Rights to Land in the Brazilian Amazon. J. Ensminger, Changing Property Rights: Reconciling Formal and Informal Rights to Land in Africa. R.H. Bates and K.A. Shepsle, Intertemporal Institutions. B.R. Weingast, The Political Foundations of Limited Government: Parliament and Sovereign Debt in 17th- and 18th-Century England. J.N. Drobak, Credible Commitment in the United States: Substantive and Structural Limits on the Avoidance of Public Debt. Learning, Cognition and Rationality: A. Clark, Economic Reason: The Interplay of Individual Learning and External Structure. W.B. Arthur, Beyond Rational Expectations: Indeterminancy in Economic and Financial Markets. P.A. David and W.C. Sanderson, Making Use of Treacherous Advice: Cognitive Process, Bayesian Adaptation, and the Tenacity of Unreliable Knowledge. Index.
About John N. Drobak
John N. Drobak is Professor of Law at the Washington University School of Law. He also holds appointments at Washington University as a Professor of Economics and a Professor of Business, as well as Professor of Business at the United States Business School in Prague. He received his J.D. from Stanford University and writes about issues in economic regulation. John V.C. Nye, an Associate Professor of Economics and History at Washington University, received his Ph.D. from Northwestern University. He is the recipient of a Washington University Faculty Research Grant and a John M. Olin Research Fellowship. He has published widely on economic history and industrial organization.