Dynamic Alliance Auctions

Dynamic Alliance Auctions : A Mechanism for Internet-Based Transportation Markets

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Description

An introduction to the new auction format known as 'Dynamic Alliance Auctions' which has been developed for Internet-based transportation marketplaces. The format allows for a packagewise placement of transportation orders even if these orders stem from different shippers. This, in turn, increases utilization of truck capacity and reduces risk for carriers. It also results in bringing down transportation prices without shrinking margins. After examining the landscape of Internet-based transportation marketplaces, the book identifies vital characteristics and needs of transportation business. The book shows how Dynamic Alliance Auctions combine ideas of matching theory, auctions and bargaining to fit these needs. Finally, the performance of this auction format is investigated analytically and experimentally using a modified private-value framework and different informational settings.
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Product details

  • Paperback | 150 pages
  • 155 x 235 x 8.89mm | 530g
  • Physica-Verlag GmbH & Co
  • Heidelberg, Germany
  • English
  • 2004 ed.
  • 31 Tables, black and white; 2 Illustrations, black and white; X, 150 p. 2 illus.
  • 3790800988
  • 9783790800982

Back cover copy

The book introduces the new auction format known as 'Dynamic Alliance Auctions' which has been developed for Internet-based transportation marketplaces. The format allows for a packagewise placement of transportation orders even if these orders stem from different shippers. This, in turn, increases utilization of truck capacity and reduces risk for carriers. It also results in bringing down transportation prices without shrinking margins. After examining the landscape of Internet-based transportation marketplaces, the book identifies vital characteristics and needs of transportation business. The book shows how Dynamic Alliance Auctions combine ideas of matching theory, auctions and bargaining to fit these needs. Finally, the performance of this auction format is investigated analytically and experimentally using a modified private-value framework and different informational settings.
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Table of contents

1 Introduction.- 1.1 Motivation.- 1.2 Environment and Aim of the Thesis.- 1.3 Contribution of the Thesis.- 1.4 Organization of the Thesis.- I Background.- 2 Theories.- 2.1 Axiomatic Models of Bargaining.- 2.1.1 The Basic Model.- 2.1.2 Literature on 2-Person Bargaining.- 2.1.3 Solution Concepts.- 2.1.4 A Note on the Strategic Approach to Bargaining.- 2.2 Auctions.- 2.2.1 Terminology.- 2.2.2 Literature on Auctions.- 2.2.3 Solution Concepts.- 2.2.4 Theoretical Models.- 2.2.5 Revenue, Efficiency, and Collusion in Private Value Auctions.- 2.2.6 Combinatorial Auctions.- 2.3 The Marriage Problem.- 2.3.1 Stability.- 2.3.2 Matching Procedures or Who-Proposes-to-Whom.- 2.3.3 Reporting Preferences.- 3 Internet-Based Freight Marketplaces.- 3.1 A Classification Scheme.- 3.1.1 Participants.- 3.1.2 Traded Goods.- 3.1.3 Trade.- 3.2 A Critical Analysis.- 3.2.1 The Blackboard Teleroute.- 3.2.2 The Auction House Benelog.- 3.2.3 The Exchange Eulox.- 3.2.4 Conclusion.- II Freight Auctions.- 4 Conventional Freight Auctions.- 4.1 Markets Considered.- 4.2 Empty Lanes.- 4.2.1 Standard Auctions & Cost Calculation.- 4.2.2 Combinatorial Auctions - No Solution to Spot Markets.- 4.3 Packagewize Placements.- 4.3.1 Imbalanced Flows of Goods.- 4.3.2 Monotony, Pareto-Optimality, and Reserve Prices.- 4.4 Conclusion.- 5 Dynamic Alliance Auctions.- 5.1 Stages of an Appropriate Mechanism.- 5.2 How Dynamic Alliance Auctions Work.- 5.2.1 The Basic Procedure.- 5.2.2 General Notation and Terms.- 5.2.3 The Rules of Dynamic Alliance Auctions.- 5.2.4 An Illustrative Example.- III Evaluation.- 6 Stages and Price Division.- 6.1 A Trade-off for Shippers.- 6.2 Collection Stage.- 6.3 Aggregation Stage.- 6.4 Placement Stage.- 6.5 Division of the Package Price.- 6.5.1 Axioms Satisfied.- 6.5.2 Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky.- 6.5.3 An Appropriate Weight.- 6.6 Summary.- 7 Efficiency, Payoff, and Bids.- 7.1 Why Investigate Efficiency, Payoff, and Bids.- 7.2 Paul.- 7.3 Polar Cases.- 7.3.1 Perfectly Balanced Flows.- 7.3.2 Perfectly Imbalanced Flows.- 7.4 Expected Payoff.- 7.4.1 If 1,51 and IS'I Are Common Knowledge.- 7.4.2 If Only the Total Number of Bidders is Common Knowledge.- 7.4.3 If the Number of Bidders is Unknown.- 7.4.4 Maximizing Payoff.- 7.5 Polar Case Equilibria and Intuitive Bidding Strategies.- 7.5.1 Breakdown of the Polar Case Equilibria.- 7.5.2 Intuition & Ad-hoc Strategies.- 7.6 Summary.- 8 Experiment.- 8.1 Experimental Design.- 8.1.1 Procedure.- 8.1.2 Information.- 8.1.3 General Remarks.- 8.2 Experimental Results.- 8.2.1 Average Payoffs and Revenue Efficiency.- 8.2.2 Bid-to-Value Ratios.- 8.2.3 Bids in T1 and T2: Intuition Revisited.- 8.2.4 Summary.- 9 Putting Insights to Practice.- A Proofs.- B Formulas.- B.1 Expected Payoff.- C Experiment.- C.1 Translated Instructions.- List of Figures.- List of Tables.- References.
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