Preface. Introduction. Part I: Survey Articles. Economic Theory of Risk Exchanges: A Review; C. Gollier. The Demand and Supply of Liability Insurance; P.M. Danzon, S.E. Harrington. Moral Hazard and Insurance Contracts; R.A. Winter. Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: A Selective Survey; G. Dionne, N. Doherty. Financial Pricing of Property and Liability Insurance; J.D. Cummins. Econometric Models of Accident Distributions; M. Boyer, G. Dionne, C. Vanasse. Part II: Essays. A. Theoretical Models. Optimal Insurance: A Non Expected Utility Analysis; E. Karni. Background Risk, Prudence and the Demand for Insurance; L. Eeckhoudt, M. Kimball. Optimum Insurance with Deviant Beliefs; J.M. Marshall. Increases in Risk and the Demand for Insurance; Y. Alarie, G. Dionne, L. Eeckhoudt. Crop Insurance in Incomplete Markets; B. Ramaswami, T.L. Roe. How Does Ambiguity Affect Insurance Decisions? H. Kunreuther, R.M. Hogarth. Moral Hazard and Competitive Insurance Markets; R.J. Arnott. Probationary Periods and Time-Dependent Deductibles in Insurance Markets with Adverse Selection; C. Fluet. Insurance Classifications and Social Welfare; S.A. Rea. B. Empirical Models. Social Insurance in Market Contexts: Implications of the Structure of Workers' Compensation for Job Safety and Wages; M.J. Moore, W.K. Viscusi. Testing for Asymmetric Information in Canadian Automobile Insurance; B. Dahlby. Incentive Effects of no Fault Automobile Insurance: Evidence from Insurance Claim Data; J.D. Cummins, M.A. Weiss. Measuring the Effects of the 1978 Quebec Automobile Insurance Act with the DRAG Model; M. Gaudry. Liability versus No-Fault Automobile Insurance Regimes: An Analysis of the Experience in Quebec; R.A. Devlin. Index.