Consciousness and Physicalism

Consciousness and Physicalism : A Defense of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy

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Consciousness and Physicalism explores the nature of consciousness, arguing that ontologically speaking, consciousness and matter are one and the same since both are physical entities. By synthesizing work in the philosophy of mind and metaphysics from the last twenty years and forging a dialogue with contemporary research in empirical sciences of the mind, Andreas Elpidorou develops an account of the concepts that we deploy when we introspectively examine our conscious experiences, and defends the view that the uniqueness of consciousness is an unavoidable consequence of being conscious of consciousness. This book provides an up-to-date, systematic defense of the phenomenal concept strategy, and offers a theory-based formulation of physicalism. Elpidorou links metaphysics and empirical philosophy of mind by showing how embodied cognition (specifically, perceptual accounts of concepts) allows us to explain the appearance of contingency that is present in mind-brain identity statements. His argument is situated at the intersections of philosophy of mind, metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of cognitive science, and advances the debate regarding the ontological status of more

Product details

  • Hardback | 272 pages
  • 152 x 229mm
  • Taylor & Francis Ltd
  • London, United Kingdom
  • English
  • 1138928054
  • 9781138928053
  • 2,269,169

About Andreas Elpidorou

Andreas Elpidorou is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Louisville, more

Table of contents

Part I: The Phenomenal and the Physical 1. Introduction: The Puzzle of Consciousness 2. The Physicalist Outlook Part II: Conceptual Analysis at Its Limits 3. A Priori Entailment and Conceptual Competence 4. Dimensions of Conceivability Part III: Conceptual Dualism 5. Defending the Phenomenal Concept Strategy 6. Why Seeing is not Deducing 7. Introspection and Phenomenal Concepts 8. The Persistence of Contingency 9. The Illusion of Embodied Contingency 10. Conclusionshow more