Conceptual Flux : Mental Representation, Misrepresentation, and Concept Change
The book goes much further than criticism, however: Perlman formulates a naturalistic theory of representation that reluctantly accepts the unfortunate conclusion that there is no misrepresentation. He adds a pragmatic theory of content, which explains apparent misrepresentation as concept change. Mental representations can be good or bad in specific contexts and for specific purposes, but their correctness is not a matter of truth and falsity. The pragmatic approach to mental content has implications for epistemology, theories of truth, metaphysics, psychology, and AI (specifically connectionist networks).
Readership: One of the most thorough examinations of mental representation and meaning holism available, this book should be read by everyone interested in the mind and how ideas can have meaning. It crosses boundaries from philosophy into psychology, linguistics, AI and cognitive science.
- Paperback | 438 pages
- 154.94 x 234.95 x 26.67mm | 707.6g
- 07 Dec 2010
- Dordrecht, Netherlands
- Softcover reprint of hardcover 1st ed. 2000
- XXIV, 438 p.
Other books in this series
21 Oct 2011
Prerational Intelligence: Adaptive Behavior and Intelligent Systems Without Symbols and Logic , Volume 1, Volume 2 Prerational Intelligence: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on the Behavior of Natural and Artificial Systems, Volume 3
20 Nov 2013
Table of contents