Comparative Constitutional Design
This volume brings together essays by many of the leading scholars of comparative constitutional design from many perspectives to collectively assess what we know - and do not know - about the design process as well as particular institutional choices concerning executive power, constitutional amendment processes and many other issues. Bringing together positive and normative analysis, this volume provides state of the art in a field of growing theoretical and practical importance.
- Electronic book text | 325 pages
- 07 Mar 2012
- CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
- Cambridge University Press (Virtual Publishing)
- Cambridge, United Kingdom
- 19 b/w illus. 6 tables
Table of contents
1. Introduction Tom Ginsburg; Part I. Design Processes: 2. Clearing and strengthening the channels of constitution-making Jon Elster; 3. What we know - and don't know - about design processes Justin Blount, Zachary Elkins and Tom Ginsburg; Part II. How Do We Get to Constitutional Design? Constraints and Conditions: 4. Democratization and countermajoritarian institutions: the role of power and constitutional design in self-enforcing democracy Susan Alberts, Chris Warshaw and Barry R. Weingast; 5. The origins of parliamentary responsibility Adam Przeworski, Tamar Asadurian and Anjali Thomas Bohlken; 6. The social foundations of China's living constitution Randall Peerenboom; 7. The political economy of constitutionalism in a post-secular world Ran Hirschl; Part III. Issues in Institutional Design: 8. Designing constitutional amendment rules, to scale Rosalind Dixon and Richard Holden; 9. Federalism: general welfare, interstate commerce, and economic analysis Robert D. Cooter and Neil Seigel; 10. Personal laws and equality: the case of India Martha Nussbaum; 11. Constitutional adjudication, Italian style John Ferejohn and Pasquale Pasquino; 12. Tyrannophobia Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermuele; 13. Do executive term limits cause constitutional crises? Tom Ginsburg, Zachary Elkins and James Melton.
'The combination of theoretical and empirical essays will further develop comparative constitutional design as an important perspective and project within comparative constitutional studies.' International Journal of Constitutional Law
About Tom Ginsburg
Tom Ginsburg is the Leo Spitz Professor of Law and Political Science at the University of Chicago. He is the co-editor of The Endurance of National Constitutions (with Zachary Elkins and James Melton, 2009) which won the best book award from the Comparative Democratization Section of the American Political Science Association. His other books include Rule by Law: The Politics of Courts in Authoritarian Regimes (with Tamir Moustafa, 2008) and Judicial Review in New Democracies (2003), which won the American Political Science Association's C. Herman Pritchett Award for best book on law and courts.