Classic Papers in Natural Resource Economics Revisited

Classic Papers in Natural Resource Economics Revisited

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Classic Papers in Natural Resource Economics Revisited is the first attempt to bring together a selection of classic papers in natural resource economics, alongside reflections by highly regarded professionals about how these papers have impacted the field. The seven papers included in this volume are grouped into five sections, representing the five core areas in natural resource economics: the intertemporal problem; externalities and market failure; property rights, institutions and public choice; the economics of exhaustible resources; and the economics of renewable resources. The seven papers are written by distinguished economists, five of them Nobelists. The papers, originally published between 1960 and 2000, addressed key issues in resource production, pricing, consumption, planning, management and policy. The original insights, fresh perspectives and bold vision embodied in these papers had a profound influence on the readership and they became classics in the field. This is the first attempt to publish original commentaries from a diverse group of scholars to identify, probe and analyse the ways in which these papers have impacted and shaped the discourse in natural resource economics. Although directed primarily at an academic audience, this book should also be of great appeal to researchers, policy analysts, and natural resource professionals, in general. This book was published as a series of symposia in the Journal of Natural Resources Policy Research.show more

Product details

  • Hardback | 424 pages
  • 174 x 246 x 25.4mm | 839g
  • Taylor & Francis Ltd
  • ROUTLEDGE
  • London, United Kingdom
  • English
  • 1138905798
  • 9781138905795

Table of contents

Introduction Chennat Gopalakrishnan Section I: The Intertemporal Problem 1. Uncertainty and the Evaluation of Public Investment Decisions Kenneth J. Arrow and Robert C. Lind 2. The relevance and the limits of the Arrow-Lind Theorem Luc Baumstark and Christian Gollier 3. A reconsideration of Arrow-Lind: risk aversion, risk sharing, and agent choice Eric Fesselmeyer, Leonard J. Mirman, and Marc Santugini 4. Evaluating uncertain public projects with rival and non-rival benefits Bram Gallagher and Arthur Snow 5. Probing the limits of risk-neutral government Alan Randall 6. Are we in this together? Risk bearing and collective action Carlisle Ford Runge and Justin Andrew Johnson 7. Evaluation of public investments and individual discounting Mario Tirelli 8. Rebutting Arrow and Lind: why governments should use market rates for discounting Deborah Lucas 9. Revisiting Arrow-Lind: Managing Sovereign Disaster Risk Reinhard Mechler and Stefan Hochrainer-Stigler 10. Size matters: capital market size and risk-return profiles Keiran Sharpe and Massimiliano Tani 11. Microeconomic foundations of bailouts Marian Moszoro Section II: Externalities and Market Failure - Ronald H. Coase 12. The Problem of Social Cost Ronald H. Coase 13. Battles lost and wars won: reflections on 'The Problem of Social Cost' Mary M. Shirley 14. The importance of being misunderstood: the Coase theorem and the legacy of 'The Problem of Social Cost' Steven G. Medema 15. Infringement as nuisance: intellectual property rights and The Problem of Social Cost Paul J. Heald 16. About some distortions in the interpretation of 'the problem of social cost' Claude Menard 17. The successes and failures of Professor Coase Ning Wang Section III: Property Rights, Institutions and Public Choice - Garrett J. Hardin and Elinor Ostrom 18. The Tragedy of the Commons Garrett J. Hardin 19. The Core Challenges of Moving Beyond Garrett Hardin Xavier Basurto & Elinor Ostrom 20. Revising the Commons Paradigm Fikret Berkes 21. Hardin's Brilliant Tragedy and a Non-Sequitur Response Thrainn Eggertsson 22. Free Parking at Christmas Is Not a Tragedy of the Commons William A. Fischel 23. Guarding the Guardians: Enforcement in the Commons C. Ford Runge 24. From 'Tragedy' to Commons: How Hardin's Mistake Might Save the World Peter A. Walker 25. Collective action and the evolution of social norms Elinor Ostrom 26. The collective action theory path to contextual analysis Paul Dragos Aligica and Filippo Sabetti 27. Contextualizing the influence of social norms, collective action on social-ecological systems Tom P. Evans and Daniel H. Cole 28. Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms: the principled optimism of Elinor Ostrom Matthew R. Auer 29. Crossing disciplinary boundaries L. Schroeder 30. Elinor Ostrom's challenge for laboratory experiments Rick K. Wilson 31. The evolution of social norms in conflict resolution Lisa Blomgren Amsler 32. The evolution of elite and societal norms pertaining to the emergence of federal-tribal co-management of natural resources Shane Day Section IV: The Economics of Exhaustible Resources - Robert Solow and William Nordhaus 33. The Economics of Resources or the Resources of Economics Robert Solow 34. Reflections on Solow's The Economics of Resources or the Resources of Economics Peter Berck 35. What Does the Empirical Work Inspired by Solow's The Economics of Resources or the Resources of Economics Tell Us? Robert Halvorsen 36. What Would Solow Say? John M. Hartwick 37. Reflections on Solow's 1974 Richard T. Ely Address Alan Randall 38. The Economics of Resources and the Economics of Climate R. David Simpson 39. Celebrating Solow: Lessons from Natural Resource Economics for Environmental Policy V. Kerry Smith 40. The Allocation of Energy Resources William Nordhaus 41. Modeling long term energy futures after Nordhaus (1973) Gregory F. Nemet 42. The allocation of energy resources in the very long run Roger Fouquet 43. The world before climate change Frank Ackerman 44. Energy modeling post 1973 John Feddersen, Florian Habermacherb, Jan Imhofc and Rick van der Ploeg 45. The allocation of energy conservation Franz Wirl 46. A retrospective on The Allocation of Energy Resource William D. Nordhaus by Koundouri, Reppas, & Souliotis 47. Backstop technology: model keystone or energy systems transition guide essay Aviel Verbruggen 48. Caveats for climate policy from Nordhaus's The Allocation of Energy Resources Isabel Galiana Section V: Renewable Resources - Paul A. Samuelson 49. Economics of Forestry in an Evolving Society Paul A. Samuelson 50. Samuelson's Economics of Forestry in an Evolving Society: Still an Important and Relevant Article Thirty Six Years Later Gregory S. Amacher 51. Reflections on Samuelson's Economics of Forestry in an Evolving Society Peter Berck & Lunyu Xie 52. Samuelson and 21st Century Tropical Forest Economics Elizabeth J. Z. Robinson & Heidi J. Albers 53. Putting Samuelson's Economics of Forestry in an Evolving Society into Context: The Limits of Forest Economics in Policy Debates David H. Newman & John E. Wagner 54. Samuelson on Forest Economics: An Inadvertent Tribute to Faustmann, and a Few Others Colin Price 55. Thoughts on Paul Samuelson's Classic, Economics of Forestry in an Evolving Society Roger A. Sedjoshow more

About Chennat Gopalakrishnan

Chennat Gopalakrishnan is Professor (Emeritus) of Natural Resource Economics at the University of Hawaii, USA. He has published seven books and approximately 115 journal articles and technical papers on current and emerging issues in natural resource economics and policy. He is the Editor-In-Chief of the Journal of Natural Resources Policy Research.show more