Cases Determined by the St. Louis, Kansas City and Springfield Courts of Appeals of the State of Missouri Volume 66

Cases Determined by the St. Louis, Kansas City and Springfield Courts of Appeals of the State of Missouri Volume 66

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This historic book may have numerous typos and missing text. Purchasers can usually download a free scanned copy of the original book (without typos) from the publisher. Not indexed. Not illustrated. 1896 edition. Excerpt: ...app--25 the judgment has been rendered. ' Such a fee, when allowed, falls within the designation of general costs. In allowing and taxing it, the judgment as to the payment is in no way disturbed. Where a party complains that the judgment taxing the costs is wrong, for any reason, he must, to obtain relief, lodge his complaint with the court rendering such judgment, at the term at which it is rendered, for after the end of the term, the power of the court over the judgment is at an end. It can not, after the end of the term, change or modify its judgment in respect to the costs. Mann v. Warner, ante. And this upon the well established principle that the error or mistake in a judgment can not be corrected in a court of law after the lapse of the term at which the judgment was rendered. Wilson v. Boughton, 50 Mo. 17, and cases cited. No reason is perceived why the fee of a referee may not be allowed by the court and taxed by the clerk, after the lapse of the term at which the final judgment is rendered, since this does not, as we have seen, have the efiect to disturb the judgment. It will not do to say that the allowance of the referee's fee, when made at or before the time of the rendition of the judgment on the report, is any more the component part of the judgment than any other item of costs that is allowed and fixed by law. It has been held that even when the fee of the referee is allowed in the judgment confirming the report of such referee, the setting aside of the judgment does not disturb the allowance of the referee because such an allowance is not an inseparable part of the judgment. Conroy v. Frost, 38 Mo. App. 351. That the rule declared in Ladd v. Couzins, 52 Mo. 454, is wholly inapplicable to the allowance and taxation...show more

Product details

  • Paperback | 226 pages
  • 189 x 246 x 12mm | 413g
  • Rarebooksclub.com
  • United States
  • English
  • black & white illustrations
  • 1236877810
  • 9781236877819