The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java

The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java

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"In the Java world, security is not viewed as an add-on a feature. It is a pervasive way of thinking. Those who forget to think in a secure mindset end up in trouble. But just because the facilities are there doesn't mean that security is assured automatically. A set of standard practices has evolved over the years. The Secure(R) Coding(R) Standard for Java(TM) is a compendium of these practices. These are not theoretical research papers or product marketing blurbs. This is all serious, mission-critical, battle-tested, enterprise-scale stuff." -James A. Gosling, Father of the Java Programming Language An essential element of secure coding in the Java programming language is a well-documented and enforceable coding standard. Coding standards encourage programmers to follow a uniform set of rules determined by the requirements of the project and organization, rather than by the programmer's familiarity or preference. Once established, these standards can be used as a metric to evaluate source code (using manual or automated processes).The CERT(R) Oracle(R) Secure Coding Standard for Java(TM) provides rules designed to eliminate insecure coding practices that can lead to exploitable vulnerabilities. Application of the standard's guidelines will lead to higher-quality systems-robust systems that are more resistant to attack. Such guidelines are required for the wide range of products coded in Java-for devices such as PCs, game players, mobile phones, home appliances, and automotive electronics. After a high-level introduction to Java application security, seventeen consistently organized chapters detail specific rules for key areas of Java development. For each area, the authors present noncompliant examples and corresponding compliant solutions, show how to assess risk, and offer references for further information. Each rule is prioritized based on the severity of consequences, likelihood of introducing exploitable vulnerabilities, and cost of remediation. The standard provides secure coding rules for the Java SE 6 Platform including the Java programming language and libraries, and also addresses new features of the Java SE 7 Platform.It describes language behaviors left to the discretion of JVM and compiler implementers, guides developers in the proper use of Java's APIs and security architecture, and considers security concerns pertaining to standard extension APIs (from the javax package hierarchy).The standard covers security issues applicable to these libraries: lang, util, Collections, Concurrency Utilities, Logging, Management, Reflection, Regular Expressions, Zip, I/O, JMX, JNI, Math, Serialization, and more

Product details

  • Paperback | 744 pages
  • 177.8 x 228.6 x 71.12mm | 1,088.62g
  • Pearson Education (US)
  • Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers Inc
  • New Jersey, United States
  • English
  • w. figs.
  • 0321803957
  • 9780321803955
  • 609,546

About Fred Long

Ve>Fred Long is a senior lecturer and director of learning and teaching in the Department of Computer Science, Aberystwyth University in the United Kingdom. He lectures on formal methods; Java, C++, and C programming paradigms and programming-related security issues. He is chairman of the British Computer Society's Mid-Wales Sub-Branch. Fred has been a Visiting Scientist at the Software Engineering Institute since 1992. Recently, his research has involved the investigation of vulnerabilities in Java. Dhruv Mohindra is a senior software engineer at Persistent Systems Limited, India, where he develops monitoring software for widely used enterprise servers. He has worked for CERT at the Software Engineering Institute and continues to collaborate to improve the state of security awareness in the programming community. Dhruv has also worked for Carnegie Mellon University, where he obtained his master of science degree in information security policy and management. He holds an undergraduate degree in computer engineering from Pune University, India, where he researched with Calsoft, Inc., during his academic pursuit. A writing enthusiast, Dhruv occasionally contributes articles to technology magazines and online resources. He brings forth his experience and learning from developing and securing service oriented applications, server monitoring software, mobile device applications, web-based data miners, and designing user-friendly security interfaces. Robert C. Seacord is a computer security specialist and writer. He is the author of books on computer security, legacy system modernization, and component-based software engineering. Robert manages the Secure Coding Initiative at CERT, located in Carnegie Mellon's Software Engineering Institute in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. CERT, among other security-related activities, regularly analyzes software vulnerability reports and assesses the risk to the Internet and other critical infrastructure. Robert is an adjunct professor in the Carnegie Mellon University School of Computer Science and in the Information Networking Institute. Robert started programming professionally for IBM in 1982, working in communications and operating system software, processor development, and software engineering. Robert also has worked at the X Consortium, where he developed and maintained code for the Common Desktop Environment and the X Window System. Robert has a bachelor's degree in computer science from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute. Dean F. Sutherland is a senior software security engineer at CERT. Dean received his Ph.D. in software engineering from Carnegie Mellon in 2008. Before his return to academia, he spent 14 years working as a professional software engineer at Tartan, Inc. He spent the last six of those years as a senior member of the technical staff and a technical lead for compiler backend technology. He was the primary active member of the corporate R&D group, was a key instigator of the design and deployment of a new software development process for Tartan, led R&D projects, and provided both technical and project leadership for the 12-person compiler back-end group. David Svoboda is a software security engineer at CERT. David has been the primary developer on a diverse set of software development projects at Carnegie Mellon since 1991, ranging from hierarchical chip modeling and social organization simulation to automated machine translation (AMT). His KANTOO AMT software, developed in 1996, is still in production use at Caterpillar. He has over 13 years of Java development experience, starting with Java 2, and his Java projects include Tomcat servlets and Eclipse plug-ins. David is also actively involved in several ISO standards groups: the JTC1/SC22/WG14 group for the C programming language and the JTC1/ SC22/WG21 group for more

Table of contents

Foreword xvii Preface xix Acknowledgments xxxi About the Authors xxxiii Chapter 1: Introduction 1 Misplaced Trust 2 Injection Attacks 2 Leaking Sensitive Data 4 Leaking Capabilities 6 Denial of Service 7 Serialization 10 Concurrency, Visibility, and Memory 11 Principle of Least Privilege 18 Security Managers 19 Class Loaders 21 Summary 21 Chapter 2: Input Validation and Data Sanitization (IDS) 23 Rules 23 Risk Assessment Summary 24 IDS00-J. Sanitize untrusted data passed across a trust boundary 24 IDS01-J. Normalize strings before validating them 34 IDS02-J. Canonicalize path names before validating them 36 IDS03-J. Do not log unsanitized user input 41 IDS04-J. Limit the size of files passed to ZipInputStream 43 IDS05-J. Use a subset of ASCII for file and path names 46 IDS06-J. Exclude user input from format strings 48 IDS07-J. Do not pass untrusted, unsanitized data to the Runtime.exec() method 50 IDS08-J. Sanitize untrusted data passed to a regex 54 IDS09-J. Do not use locale-dependent methods on locale-dependent data without specifying the appropriate locale 59 IDS10-J. Do not split characters between two data structures 60 IDS11-J. Eliminate noncharacter code points before validation 66 IDS12-J. Perform lossless conversion of String data between differing character encodings 68 IDS13-J. Use compatible encodings on both sides of file or network I/O 71 Chapter 3: Declarations and Initialization (DCL) 75 Rules 75 Risk Assessment Summary 75 DCL00-J. Prevent class initialization cycles 75 DCL01-J. Do not reuse public identifiers from the Java Standard Library 79 DCL02-J. Declare all enhanced for statement loop variables final 81 Chapter 4: Expressions (EXP) 85 Rules 85 Risk Assessment Summary 85 EXP00-J. Do not ignore values returned by methods 86 EXP01-J. Never dereference null pointers 88 EXP02-J. Use the two-argument Arrays.equals() method to compare the contents of arrays 90 EXP03-J. Do not use the equality operators when comparing values of boxed primitives 91 EXP04-J. Ensure that autoboxed values have the intended type 97 EXP05-J. Do not write more than once to the same variable within an expression 100 EXP06-J. Do not use side-effecting expressions in assertions 103 Chapter 5: Numeric Types and Operations (NUM) 105 Rules 105 Risk Assessment Summary 106 NUM00-J. Detect or prevent integer overflow 106 NUM01-J. Do not perform bitwise and arithmetic operations on the same data 114 NUM02-J. Ensure that division and modulo operations do not result in divide-by-zero errors 119 NUM03-J. Use integer types that can fully represent the possible range of unsigned data 121 NUM04-J. Do not use floating-point numbers if precise computation is required 122 NUM05-J. Do not use denormalized numbers 125 NUM06-J. Use the strictfp modifier for floating-point calculation consistency across platforms 128 NUM07-J. Do not attempt comparisons with NaN 132 NUM08-J. Check floating-point inputs for exceptional values 134 NUM09-J. Do not use floating-point variables as loop counters 136 NUM10-J. Do not construct BigDecimal objects from floating-point literals 138 NUM11-J. Do not compare or inspect the string representation of floating-point values 139 NUM12-J. Ensure conversions of numeric types to narrower types do not result in lost or misinterpreted data 141 NUM13-J. Avoid loss of precision when converting primitive integers to floating-point 146 Chapter 6: Object Orientation (OBJ) 151 Rules 151 Risk Assessment Summary 152 OBJ00-J. Limit extensibility of classes and methods with invariants to trusted subclasses only 152 OBJ01-J. Declare data members as private and provide accessible wrapper methods 159 OBJ02-J. Preserve dependencies in subclasses when changing superclasses 162 OBJ03-J. Do not mix generic with nongeneric raw types in new code 169 OBJ04-J. Provide mutable classes with copy functionality to safely allow passing instances to untrusted code 175 OBJ05-J. Defensively copy private mutable class members before returning their references 180 OBJ06-J. Defensively copy mutable inputs and mutable internal components 185 OBJ07-J. Sensitive classes must not let themselves be copied 189 OBJ08-J. Do not expose private members of an outer class from within a nested class 192 OBJ09-J. Compare classes and not class names 194 OBJ10-J. Do not use public static nonfinal variables 197 OBJ11-J. Be wary of letting constructors throw exceptions 199 Chapter 7: Methods (MET) 209 Rules 209 Risk Assessment Summary 210 MET00-J. Validate method arguments 210 MET01-J. Never use assertions to validate method arguments 213 MET02-J. Do not use deprecated or obsolete classes or methods 215 MET03-J. Methods that perform a security check must be declared private or final 217 MET04-J. Do not increase the accessibility of overridden or hidden methods 218 MET05-J. Ensure that constructors do not call overridable methods 220 MET06-J. Do not invoke overridable methods in clone() 223 MET07-J. Never declare a class method that hides a method declared in a superclass or superinterface 226 MET08-J. Ensure objects that are equated are equatable 229 MET09-J. Classes that define an equals() method must also define a hashCode() method 238 MET10-J. Follow the general contract when implementing the compareTo() method 241 MET11-J. Ensure that keys used in comparison operations are immutable 243 MET12-J. Do not use finalizers 248 Chapter 8: Exceptional Behavior (ERR) 255 Rules 255 Risk Assessment Summary 255 ERR00-J. Do not suppress or ignore checked exceptions 256 ERR01-J. Do not allow exceptions to expose sensitive information 263 ERR02-J. Prevent exceptions while logging data 268 ERR03-J. Restore prior object state on method failure 270 ERR04-J. Do not exit abruptly from a finally block 275 ERR05-J. Do not let checked exceptions escape from a finally block 277 ERR06-J. Do not throw undeclared checked exceptions 280 ERR07-J. Do not throw RuntimeException, Exception, or Throwable 285 ERR08-J. Do not catch NullPointerException or any of its ancestors 288 ERR09-J. Do not allow untrusted code to terminate the JVM 296 Chapter 9: Visibility and Atomicity (VNA) 301 Rules 301 Risk Assessment Summary 301 VNA00-J. Ensure visibility when accessing shared primitive variables 302 VNA01-J. Ensure visibility of shared references to immutable objects 306 VNA02-J. Ensure that compound operations on shared variables are atomic 309 VNA03-J. Do not assume that a group of calls to independently atomic methods is atomic 317 VNA04-J. Ensure that calls to chained methods are atomic 323 VNA05-J. Ensure atomicity when reading and writing 64-bit values 328 Chapter 10: Locking (LCK) 331 Rules 331 Risk Assessment Summary 332 LCK00-J. Use private final lock objects to synchronize classes that may interact with untrusted code 332 LCK01-J. Do not synchronize on objects that may be reused 339 LCK02-J. Do not synchronize on the class object returned by getClass() 343 LCK03-J. Do not synchronize on the intrinsic locks of high-level concurrency objects 347 LCK04-J. Do not synchronize on a collection view if the backing collection is accessible 348 LCK05-J. Synchronize access to static fields that can be modified by untrusted code 351 LCK06-J. Do not use an instance lock to protect shared static data 352 LCK07-J. Avoid deadlock by requesting and releasing locks in the same order 355 LCK08-J. Ensure actively held locks are released on exceptional conditions 365 LCK09-J. Do not perform operations that can block while holding a lock 370 LCK10-J. Do not use incorrect forms of the double-checked locking idiom 375 LCK11-J. Avoid client-side locking when using classes that do not commit to their locking strategy 381 Chapter 11: Thread APIs (THI) 387 Rules 387 Risk Assessment Summary 387 THI00-J. Do not invoke 388 THI01-J. Do not invoke ThreadGroup methods 390 THI02-J. Notify all waiting threads rather than a single thread 394 THI03-J. Always invoke wait() and await() methods inside a loop 401 THI04-J. Ensure that threads performing blocking operations can be terminated 404 THI05-J. Do not use Thread.stop() to terminate threads 412 Chapter 12: Thread Pools (TPS) 417 Rules 417 Risk Assessment Summary 417 TPS00-J. Use thread pools to enable graceful degradation of service during traffic bursts 418 TPS01-J. Do not execute interdependent tasks in a bounded thread pool 421 TPS02-J. Ensure that tasks submitted to a thread pool are interruptible 428 TPS03-J. Ensure that tasks executing in a thread pool do not fail silently 431 TPS04-J. Ensure ThreadLocal variables are reinitialized when using thread pools 436 Chapter 13: Thread-Safety Miscellaneous (TSM) 441 Rules 441 Risk Assessment Summary 441 TSM00-J. Do not override thread-safe methods with methods that are not thread-safe 442 TSM01-J. Do not let the this reference escape during object construction 445 TSM02-J. Do not use background threads during class initialization 454 TSM03-J. Do not publish partially initialized objects 459 Chapter 14: Input Output (FIO) 467 Rules 467 Risk Assessment Summary 468 FIO00-J. Do not operate on files in shared directories 468 FIO01-J. Create files with appropriate access permissions 478 FIO02-J. Detect and handle file-related errors 481 FIO03-J. Remove temporary files before termination 483 FIO04-J. Close resources when they are no longer needed 487 FIO05-J. Do not expose buffers created using the wrap() or duplicate() methods to untrusted code 493 FIO06-J. Do not create multiple buffered wrappers on a single InputStream 496 FIO07-J. Do not let external processes block on input and output streams 500 FIO08-J. Use an int to capture the return value of methods that read a character or byte 504 FIO09-J. Do not rely on the write() method to output integers outside the range 0 to 255 507 FIO10-J. Ensure the array is filled when using read() to fill an array 509 FIO11-J. Do not attempt to read raw binary data as character data 511 FIO12-J. Provide methods to read and write little-endian data 513 FIO13-J. Do not log sensitive information outside a trust boundary 516 FIO14-J. Perform proper cleanup at program termination 519 Chapter 15: Serialization (SER) 527 Rules 527 Risk Assessment Summary 528 SER00-J. Maintain serialization compatibility during class evolution 528 SER01-J. Do not deviate from the proper signatures of serialization methods 531 SER02-J. Sign then seal sensitive objects before sending them across a trust boundary 534 SER03-J. Do not serialize unencrypted, sensitive data 541 SER04-J. Do not allow serialization and deserialization to bypass the security manager 546 SER05-J. Do not serialize instances of inner classes 549 SER06-J. Make defensive copies of private mutable components during deserialization 551 SER07-J. Do not use the default serialized form for implementation-defined invariants 553 SER08-J. Minimize privileges before deserializing from a privileged context 558 SER09-J. Do not invoke overridable methods from the readObject() method 562 SER10-J. Avoid memory and resource leaks during serialization 563 SER11-J. Prevent overwriting of externalizable objects 566 Chapter 16: Platform Security (SEC) 569 Rules 569 Risk Assessment Summary 570 SEC00-J. Do not allow privileged blocks to leak sensitive information across a trust boundary 570 SEC01-J. Do not allow tainted variables in privileged blocks 574 SEC02-J. Do not base security checks on untrusted sources 577 SEC03-J. Do not load trusted classes after allowing untrusted code to load arbitrary classes 579 SEC04-J. Protect sensitive operations with security manager checks 582 SEC05-J. Do not use reflection to increase accessibility of classes, methods, or fields 585 SEC06-J. Do not rely on the default automatic signature verification provided by URLClassLoader and java.util.jar 592 SEC07-J. Call the superclass's getPermissions() method when writing a custom class loader 597 SEC08-J. Define wrappers around native methods 599 Chapter 17: Runtime Environment (ENV) 603 Rules 603 Risk Assessment Summary 603 ENV00-J. Do not sign code that performs only unprivileged operations 604 ENV01-J. Place all security-sensitive code in a single jar and sign and seal it 606 ENV02-J. Do not trust the values of environment variables 610 ENV03-J. Do not grant dangerous combinations of permissions 613 ENV04-J. Do not disable bytecode verification 617 ENV05-J. Do not deploy an application that can be remotely monitored 618 Chapter 18: Miscellaneous (MSC) 625 Rules 625 Risk Assessment Summary 625 MSC00-J. Use SSLSocket rather than Socket for secure data exchange 626 MSC01-J. Do not use an empty infinite loop 630 MSC02-J. Generate strong random numbers 632 MSC03-J. Never hard code sensitive information 635 MSC04-J. Do not leak memory 638 MSC05-J. Do not exhaust heap space 647 MSC06-J. Do not modify the underlying collection when an iteration is in progress 653 MSC07-J. Prevent multiple instantiations of singleton objects 657 Glossary 669 References 677 Index 693show more

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