Bargaining under incomplete information, K. Chatterjee and W. Samuelson; efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading, R. Myerson and M.A. Satterthwaite; ex ante efficient, ex post individually rational trade, T. Gresik; the efficiency of linear equilibria of sealed-bid double auctions, T. Gresik; equilibria of the sealed-bid mechanism for bargaining with incomplete information, W. Leininger, et al; bilateral trade with the sealed-bid k-double auction - existence and efficiency, M.A. Satterthwaite and S. Williams; the bilateral monopoly model - approaching certainty under the split-the-difference mechanism, E. Broman; the sealed-bid mechanism - an experimental study, R. Radner and A. Schotter; minimax-regret strategies for bargaining over several variables, P.B. Linhart and R. Radner; a bargaining model with incomplete information about time preferences, A. Rubinstein; foundations of dynamic monopoly and the coase conjecture, F. Gul, et al; reputation in bargaining and durable goods monopoly, L. Ausubel and R. Deneckere; strategic delay in bargaining, A. Admati and M. Perry; a direct mechanism characterization of sequential bargaining with one-sided incomplete information, L. Ausubel and R. Deneckere; bargaining with common values, D. Vincent; cheap talk can matter in bargaining, J. Farrell and R. Gibbons; pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions, S. Matthews and A. Postlewaite; credible negotiation statements and coherent plans, R. Myerson; the rate at which a simple market converges to efficiency as the number of traders increases - an asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms, T. Gresik and M.A. Satterthwaite; the rate of convergence to efficiency in the buyer's bid double auction as the market becomes large, M.A. Satterthwaite and S. Williams; pollution claim settlements under private information, R. Rob.