• The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations See large image

    The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations (Cambridge Studies in International Relations (Paperback)) (Paperback) By (author) Daniel W. Drezner, Series edited by Steve Smith, Series edited by Thomas Biersteker, Series edited by Chris Brown, Series edited by Phil Cerny, Series edited by Alex Danchev, Series edited by Joseph M. Grieco, Series edited by John Groome, Series edited by Richard A. Higgott, Series edited by G. John Ikenberry

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    DescriptionDespite their increasing importance, there is little theoretical understanding of why nation-states initiate economic sanctions, or what determines their success. This 1999 book argues that both imposers and targets of economic coercion incorporate expectations of future conflict as well as the short-run opportunity costs of coercion into their behaviour. Drezner argues that conflict expectations have a paradoxical effect. Adversaries will impose sanctions frequently, but rarely secure concessions. Allies will be reluctant to use coercion, but once sanctions are used, they can result in significant concessions. Ironically, the most favourable distribution of payoffs is likely to result when the imposer cares the least about its reputation or the distribution of gains. The book's argument is pursued using game theory and statistical analysis, and detailed case studies of Russia's relations with newly-independent states, and US efforts to halt nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula.

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  • Full bibliographic data for The Sanctions Paradox

    The Sanctions Paradox
    Economic Statecraft and International Relations
    Authors and contributors
    By (author) Daniel W. Drezner, Series edited by Steve Smith, Series edited by Thomas Biersteker, Series edited by Chris Brown, Series edited by Phil Cerny, Series edited by Alex Danchev, Series edited by Joseph M. Grieco, Series edited by John Groome, Series edited by Richard A. Higgott, Series edited by G. John Ikenberry
    Physical properties
    Format: Paperback
    Number of pages: 364
    Width: 155 mm
    Height: 226 mm
    Thickness: 23 mm
    Weight: 567 g
    ISBN 13: 9780521644150
    ISBN 10: 0521644151

    Warengruppen-Systematik des deutschen Buchhandels: 27430
    BIC E4L: POL
    B&T Book Type: NF
    BIC geographical qualifier V2: 1DVUA
    Nielsen BookScan Product Class 3: T7.4
    B&T Modifier: Region of Publication: 03
    BIC subject category V2: JPS
    LC subject heading:
    Libri: I-PL
    Ingram Subject Code: PL
    B&T General Subject: 650
    B&T Modifier: Academic Level: 02
    LC subject heading:
    BISAC V2.8: POL024000
    B&T Merchandise Category: UP
    BISAC V2.8: POL011000
    BIC subject category V2: 1DVUA
    DC21: 327.117
    DC22: 327.117
    LC subject heading:
    DC22: 327.1/17
    LC subject heading: ,
    LC classification: HF1413.5 .D74 1999
    Thema V1.0: JPS, KCP, JPQB
    Thema geographical qualifier V1.0: 1DTA
    Edition statement
    New ed.
    Illustrations note
    4 b/w illus. 1 map 37 tables
    Imprint name
    Publication date
    18 April 2009
    Publication City/Country
    Review quote
    'The Sanctions Paradox is one of the best books written in the field of international political economy during the 1990s. It offers a simple but clever theory that explains when states are likely to employ economic sanctions and when they are likely to work. Since sanctions seem destined to remain a favourite tool of statecraft in the 21st century, this book is likely to be paid serious attention for years to come.' John Mearsheimer, University of Chicago
    Table of contents
    1. Introduction; Part I. Theory and Data: 2. A model of economic coercion; 3. Plausibility probes; 4. Statistical tests; Part II. Economic Coercion in the Former Soviet Union: 5. Russian power and preferences; 6. The extent of NIS concessions; 7. Evaluating the evidence; Part III. Choosing Between Carrots and Sticks: 8. Economic statecraft and nuclear proliferation on the Korean Peninsula; 9. Conclusions, implications, speculations.