• The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations

    The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations (Online resource) By (author) Daniel W. Drezner

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    DescriptionDespite their increasing importance, there is little theoretical understanding of why nation-states initiate economic sanctions, or what determines their success. This 1999 book argues that both imposers and targets of economic coercion incorporate expectations of future conflict as well as the short-run opportunity costs of coercion into their behaviour. Drezner argues that conflict expectations have a paradoxical effect. Adversaries will impose sanctions frequently, but rarely secure concessions. Allies will be reluctant to use coercion, but once sanctions are used, they can result in significant concessions. Ironically, the most favourable distribution of payoffs is likely to result when the imposer cares the least about its reputation or the distribution of gains. The book's argument is pursued using game theory and statistical analysis, and detailed case studies of Russia's relations with newly-independent states, and US efforts to halt nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula.

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  • Full bibliographic data for The Sanctions Paradox

    The Sanctions Paradox
    Economic Statecraft and International Relations
    Authors and contributors
    By (author) Daniel W. Drezner
    Physical properties
    Format: Online resource
    ISBN 13: 9780511549366
    ISBN 10: 0511549369

    BIC E4L: POL
    BIC geographical qualifier V2: 1DVUA
    Nielsen BookScan Product Class 3: T7.4
    BIC subject category V2: JPS
    BISAC V2.8: POL011000
    DC21: 327.117
    LC subject heading:
    LC classification: HF1413.5 .D74 1999
    Thema V1.0: JPS
    Illustrations note
    4 b/w illus. 1 map 37 tables
    Cambridge University Press (Virtual Publishing)
    Imprint name
    Cambridge University Press (Virtual Publishing)
    Publication date
    15 January 2010
    Publication City/Country
    Review quote
    'The Sanctions Paradox is one of the best books written in the field of international political economy during the 1990s. It offers a simple but clever theory that explains when states are likely to employ economic sanctions and when they are likely to work. Since sanctions seem destined to remain a favourite tool of statecraft in the 21st century, this book is likely to be paid serious attention for years to come.' John Mearsheimer, University of Chicago
    Table of contents
    1. Introduction; Part I. Theory and Data: 2. A model of economic coercion; 3. Plausibility probes; 4. Statistical tests; Part II. Economic Coercion in the Former Soviet Union: 5. Russian power and preferences; 6. The extent of NIS concessions; 7. Evaluating the evidence; Part III. Choosing Between Carrots and Sticks: 8. Economic statecraft and nuclear proliferation on the Korean Peninsula; 9. Conclusions, implications, speculations.