How We Know What isn't So: Fallibility of Human Reason in Everyday Life

How We Know What isn't So: Fallibility of Human Reason in Everyday Life

Paperback

By (author) Thomas Gilovich

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  • Publisher: The Free Press
  • Format: Paperback | 224 pages
  • Dimensions: 155mm x 231mm x 18mm | 249g
  • Publication date: 1 June 1993
  • Publication City/Country: New York
  • ISBN 10: 0029117062
  • ISBN 13: 9780029117064
  • Edition statement: Reprint
  • Illustrations note: index
  • Sales rank: 35,871

Product description

When can we trust what we believe - that "teams and players have winning streaks", that "flattery works", or that "the more people who agree, the more likely they are to be right" - and when are such beliefs suspect? Thomas Gilovich offers a guide to the fallacy of the obvious in everyday life. Illustrating his points with examples, and supporting them with the latest research findings, he documents the cognitive, social and motivational processes that distort our thoughts, beliefs, judgements and decisions. In a rapidly changing world, the biases and stereotypes that help us process an overload of complex information inevitably distort what we would like to believe is reality. Awareness of our propensity to make these systematic errors, Gilovich argues, is the first step to more effective analysis and action.

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Editorial reviews

The subtexts of this first-class critique of human (non) reason are that we all tell ourselves lies (at least some of the time)...that if you want to believe it's true, it is (faith healing, ESP)...that humans can't help seeing patterns where none exist (in clouds, in disastrous events, in gamblers' streaks). Furthermore, if you would like to learn more about how not to deceive yourself, you might take a course in one of the "soft" probabilistic sciences like psychology. This might be construed as self-serving, since Gilovich happens to teach psychology at Cornell. However, the point is well taken because such courses should expose students to a minimum of statistics - such as the law of regression, which says that when two variables are partially related, extremes in one variable are matched, on average, by less extreme variables in the other. (Children of tall parents are tall, but not as tall as their parents.) Gilovich attributes the general lack of appreciation of the law to "the compelling nature of judgment by representation" - by which the predicted outcome should be as close to the data as possible: the son of a 6'5" dad should be close to 6'5". Gilovich also points to other pitfalls in reasoning, such as failure to record negative outcomes (how many times do you dream of an old friend and not bump into him the next day?). And he discusses deeper motives - e.g., fear of dying, prospects of power or immortality, and similar self-aggrandizing traits that fortify superstitions and the will to believe. Altogether, a satisfying splash of skepticism and reason in a world where the Lake Wobegon phenomenon - "the women are strong, the men are good-looking and all the children are above average" - prevails. (Kirkus Reviews)