Game Theory
10%
off

Game Theory

By (author) , By (author)

US$94.50US$105.01

You save US$10.51

Free delivery worldwide

Available
Dispatched from the UK in 2 business days

When will my order arrive?

Description

This advanced text introduces the principles of noncooperative game theory -- including strategic form games, Nash equilibria, subgame perfection, repeated games, and games of incomplete information -- in a direct and uncomplicated style that will acquaint students with the broad spectrum of the field while highlighting and explaining what they need to know at any given point. The analytic material is accompanied by many applications, examples, and exercises. The theory of noncooperative games studies the behavior of agents in any situation where each agent's optimal choice may depend on a forecast of the opponents' choices. "Noncooperative" refers to choices that are based on the participant's perceived selfinterest. Although game theory has been applied to many fields, Fudenberg and Tirole focus on the kinds of game theory that have been most useful in the study of economic problems. They also include some applications to political science. The fourteen chapters are grouped in parts that cover static games of complete information, dynamic games of complete information, static games of incomplete information, dynamic games of incomplete information, and advanced topics.

show more

Product details

  • Hardback | 608 pages
  • 185.42 x 256.54 x 38.1mm | 1,428.81g
  • MIT Press Ltd
  • MIT Press
  • Cambridge, Mass., United States
  • English
  • 139
  • 0262061414
  • 9780262061414
  • 189,577

Review quote

"Fudenberg and Tirole's text will have an immediate and important impact on the way game theory is taught at the graduate level. Not only does it cover most of the central topics in noncooperative game theory, it is as up-to-date and complete as a book in this area could hope to be." Charles Wilson , Professor of Economics, New York University

show more

About Drew Fudenberg

Drew Fudenberg is Professor of Economics at MIT.

show more

Table of contents

Part 1 Static games of complete information: games in strategic form and Nash equilibrium; iterated strict dominance, rationalizability, and correlated equilibrium. Part 2 Dynamic games of complete information: extensive-form games; applications of multi-stage games with observed actions; repeated games. Part 3 Static games of incomplete information: Bayesian games and Bayesian equilibrium; Bayesian games and mechanism design. Part 4 Dynamic games of incomplete information: equilibrium refinements - perfect Bayesian equilibrium, sequential equilibrium, and trembling-hand perfection; reputation effects; sequential bargaining under incomplete information. Part 5 Advanced topics: more equilibrium refinements - stability, forward induction, and iterated weak dominance; advanced topics in strategic-form games; payoff-relevant strategies and Markov equilibrium; common knowledge and games.

show more