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    Delegation and Agency in International Organizations (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions) (Paperback) Edited by Darren G. Hawkins, Edited by David A. Lake, Edited by Daniel L. Nielson, Edited by Michael J. Tierney, Series edited by Randall Calvert, Series edited by Thrainn Eggertsson

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    DescriptionWhy do states delegate certain tasks and responsibilities to international organizations rather than acting unilaterally or cooperating directly? Furthermore, to what extent do states continue to control IOs once authority has been delegated? Examining a variety of different institutions including the World Trade Organization, the United Nations and the European Commission, this book explores the different methods that states employ to ensure their interests are being served, and identifies the problems involved with monitoring and managing IOs. The contributors suggest that it is not inherently more difficult to design effective delegation mechanisms at international level than at domestic level and, drawing on principal-agent theory, help explain the variations that exist in the extent to which states are willing to delegate to IOs. They argue that IOs are neither all evil nor all virtuous, but are better understood as bureaucracies that can be controlled to varying degrees by their political masters.


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    Title
    Delegation and Agency in International Organizations
    Authors and contributors
    Edited by Darren G. Hawkins, Edited by David A. Lake, Edited by Daniel L. Nielson, Edited by Michael J. Tierney, Series edited by Randall Calvert, Series edited by Thrainn Eggertsson
    Physical properties
    Format: Paperback
    Number of pages: 426
    Width: 152 mm
    Height: 224 mm
    Thickness: 26 mm
    Weight: 680 g
    Language
    English
    ISBN
    ISBN 13: 9780521680462
    ISBN 10: 0521680468
    Classifications

    Warengruppen-Systematik des deutschen Buchhandels: 27430
    BIC E4L: POL
    B&T Book Type: NF
    BIC subject category V2: JPB
    Nielsen BookScan Product Class 3: T7.4
    LC subject heading:
    BIC subject category V2: JPSN
    LC subject heading:
    BIC subject category V2: KCP, GTN
    Libri: I-PL
    Ingram Subject Code: PL
    B&T General Subject: 650
    LC subject heading:
    BIC subject category V2: JPSN1
    BISAC V2.8: POL017000
    B&T Merchandise Category: UP
    LC subject heading:
    BISAC V2.8: POL011000
    LC subject heading:
    DC22: 341.2
    LC subject heading: ,
    DC22: 352.3/6
    LC classification: JZ5566 .D45 2006
    DC22: 352.36
    Thema V1.0: JPSN
    Edition
    1
    Illustrations note
    23 tables
    Publisher
    CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
    Imprint name
    CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
    Publication date
    30 October 2006
    Publication City/Country
    Cambridge
    Author Information
    Darren G. Hawkins is Associate Professor in the Political Science Department at Brigham Young University. David A. Lake is Professor of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego. Daniel L. Nielson is Associate Professor in the Political Science Department at Brigham Young University. Michael J. Tierney is Assistant Professor in the Department of Government at The College of William & Mary.
    Review quote
    ' ... provides a stimulating contribution to the analysis of international organization ...' Review of Industrial Organization 'Delegation and Agency in International Organization develops a sophisticated Principal-Agent approach to elucidate the sources, limits and consequences of IO autonomy. The volume is unified by thoughtful application of the theory to a range of important cases and also includes more critical perspectives questioning whether PA theory provides an adequate analysis. There is no better statement of how PA models help us understand the importance and operation of international institutions and organizations. It is essential reading for scholars and students who want to really understand international organizations.' Duncan Snidal, The University of Chicago
    Table of contents
    Part I. Introduction: 1. Delegation under anarchy: states, international organizations, and principal-agent theory Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson and Michael J. Tierney; Part II. Variation in Principal Preferences, Structure, Decision Rules, and Private Benefits: 2. A problem of principals: common agency and social lending at the multilateral development banks Mona Lyne, Daniel L. Nielson and Michael J. Tierney; 3. US domestic politics and international monetary fund policy J. Lawrence Broz and Michael Brewster Hawes; 4. Why multilateralism? Foreign aid and domestic principal-agent problems Helen V. Milner; 5. Distribution, information, and delegation to international organizations: the case of IMF conditionality Lisa L. Martin; 6. Delegation and discretion in the European Union Mark A. Pollack; Part III. Variation in Agent Preferences, Legitimacy, Tasks, and Permeability: 7. How agents matter Darren G. Hawkins and Wade Jacoby; 8. Screening power: international organizations as informative agents Alexander Thompson; 9. Dutiful agents, rogue actors, or both? Staffing, voting rules, and slack in the WHO and WTO Andrew P. Cortell and Susan Peterson; 10. Delegating IMF conditionality: understanding variations in control and conformity Erica R. Gould; 11. Delegation to international courts and the limits of recontracting political power Karen J. Alter; Part IV. Directions for Future Research: 12. The logic of delegation to international organizations David A. Lake and Mathew McCubbins.