A Course in Game Theory

A Course in Game Theory

Book rating: 05 Paperback

By (author) Martin J. Osborne, By (author) Ariel Rubinstein

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  • Publisher: MIT Press
  • Format: Paperback | 368 pages
  • Dimensions: 148mm x 228mm x 24mm | 499g
  • Publication date: 5 September 1994
  • Publication City/Country: Cambridge, Mass.
  • ISBN 10: 0262650401
  • ISBN 13: 9780262650403
  • Edition statement: New.
  • Illustrations note: notes, references, index
  • Sales rank: 182,927

Product description

A Course in Game Theory presents the main ideas of game theory at a level suitable for graduate students and advanced undergraduates, emphasizing the theory's foundations and interpretations of its basic concepts. The authors provide precise definitions and full proofs of results, sacrificing generalities and limiting the scope of the material in order to do so. The text is organized in four parts: strategic games, extensive games with perfect information, extensive games with imperfect information, and coalitional games. It includes over 100 exercises.

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Author information

Ariel Rubinstein is Professor of Economics at Tel Aviv University, Israel, and Princeton University.

Customer reviews

By Burcu Kucukkeles 30 Jan 2012 5

Never order from this website! I ordered this book on January, 10, and dispatched on Jan,12, but still i couldnt have my order!!!! If my book would start walking from UK to Spain, I am sure it would have been arrived until now!!!! Very very low quality, they are definitely cheating about the dates!!!

Review quote

"I recommend this book highly, it is beautifully done..." Robert Aumann , Hebrew University

Table of contents

Part 1 Introduction: game theory; games and solutions; game theory and the theory of competitive equilibrium; rational behaviour; the steady state and deductive interpretations; bounded rationality; terminology and notation. Part 2 Strategic games: Nash equilibrium; mixed, correlated, and evolutionary equilibrium; rationalizability and iterated elimination of dominated actions; knowledge and equilibrium. Part 3 Extensive games with perfect information: extensive games with perfect information; bargaining games; repeated games; complexity considerations in repeated games; implementation theory. Part 4 Extensive games with imperfect information: extensive games with imperfect information; sequential equilibrium. Part 5 Coalitional games: the core; stable sets, the bargaining set, and the Shapley value; the Nash solution.