Commitment, Value, and Moral Realism

Commitment, Value, and Moral Realism

Hardback Cambridge Studies in Philosophy

By (author) Marcel S. Lieberman, Series edited by Ernest Sosa, Series edited by Jonathan Dancy, Series edited by John Haldane, Series edited by Gilbert Harman, Series edited by Frank Jackson, Series edited by William G. Lycan, Series edited by Sydney Shoemaker, Series edited by Judith Jarvis Thomson

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  • Publisher: CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
  • Format: Hardback | 224 pages
  • Dimensions: 145mm x 218mm x 23mm | 408g
  • Publication date: 1 November 1998
  • Publication City/Country: Cambridge
  • ISBN 10: 0521631114
  • ISBN 13: 9780521631112
  • Edition statement: New.
  • Illustrations note: black & white illustrations

Product description

Despite the importance of commitment in moral and political philosophy, there has hitherto been little extended analysis of it. Marcel Lieberman examines the conditions under which commitment is possible, and offers at the same time an indirect argument for moral realism. He argues that realist evaluative beliefs are functionally required for commitment - especially regarding its role in self-understanding - and since it is only within a realist framework that such beliefs make sense, realism about values is a condition for the possibility of commitment itself. His ambitious study addresses questions that are of great interest to analytic philosophers but also makes many connections with continental philosophy and with folk psychology, sociology and cognitive science, and will be seen as a distinctive intervention in the debate about moral realism.

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Review quote

"In this interesting book, Marcel Liberman develops a novel and sustained argument for moral realism." J.M. Bernstein--The Philosophical Review, Vol.110, No.2 (April 2001) "Lieberman successfully shows that moral realists are capable of accounting for moral commitment while nonrealists have not yet adequately done so." Ethcis

Table of contents

Acknowledgements; 1. Introduction; 2. The challengers: Allan Gibbard and Richard Rorty; 3. Commitment and intention; 4. Commitment and belief; 5. Self-conception and substantive commitments; 6. Conclusion; Bibliography; Index.