Antitrust Economics

Antitrust Economics


By (author) Roger D. Blair, By (author) David L. Kaserman


Free delivery worldwide
Dispatched in 10 business days
When will my order arrive?

  • Publisher: Oxford University Press Inc
  • Format: Hardback | 496 pages
  • Dimensions: 191mm x 236mm x 28mm | 1,043g
  • Publication date: 8 October 2009
  • Publication City/Country: New York
  • ISBN 10: 0195135350
  • ISBN 13: 9780195135350
  • Edition: 2, Revised
  • Edition statement: 2nd Revised edition
  • Illustrations note: 50 line illustrations
  • Sales rank: 1,120,922

Product description

The second edition of Antitrust Economics provides a thorough treatment of the economic theory that both motivates (and to varying degrees) guides the design and enforcement of the antitrust laws of the Untied States. Citing relevant legislation and landmark court cases, the text offers a comprehensive analysis of both horizontal and vertical antitrust issues and uses economic theory to evaluate antitrust policy throughout. The clear, accessible prose in Antitrust Economics explains the theory/policy cycle and provides thorough analysis of market structure and business conduct as they relate to antitrust policy. The text moves fluidly from theory to real world court cases to public policy, making it ideal for upper-level economics majors or law school courses in antitrust law.

Other people who viewed this bought:

Showing items 1 to 10 of 10

Other books in this category

Showing items 1 to 11 of 11

Author information

ROGER D. BLAIR is the Huber Hurst Professor of Economics at the University of Florida. His teaching and research centers mainly on issues in antitrust economics. He has published several books and many articles in economics journals and law reviews. In addition, he has provided consulting services to the Department of Justice, the Federal Trade Commission, and many private parties. DAVID L. KASERMAN is Torchmark Professor of Economics at Auburn University. He has over 25 years of experience as a professional economist and has been employed both in government agencies and academic institutions. His research interests are primarily in the fields of applied microeconomics and industrial organization

Table of contents

Antitrust in a Market Economy ; The Case for Competition ; The Case Against Monopoly ; Antitrust Response to Monopoly ; Private Enforcement ; Antitrust Building Blocks: Market Definition and Market Power ; The Law of Monopolization ; Exclusionary Practices ; Collusion: Horizontal Price Fixing ; Alternative Forms of Horizontal Collusion ; Oligopoly and Tacit Collusion ; Horizontal Mergers ; Price Discrimination ; The Theory of Vertical Integration ; Vertical Merger Policy ; Maximum Resale Price Fixing ; Resale Price Maintenance ; Tying Arrangements ; Reciprocity ; Exclusive Dealing ; Territorial and Customer Restrictions